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Abstract
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms that offer
the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller offers
a price prior to the auction; whereas in the “Sell-It-Now” format, it is the buyer. Both formats are
extensively used in online and offline markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers
and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no effects of bargaining power on aggregate outcomes.
There is, however, substantial heterogeneity within sellers. Sellers who neglect the adverse selection
effect of their own price offer in the BIN format could benefit from giving up bargaining power by
using the “Sell-It-Now” format.
JEL classifications: C72, C91, D44, D82.
Keywords: Buy-It-Now price, Sell-It-Now price, private value auction, single item auction, sequential
selling mechanism, fixed price, auction
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1 Introduction
Sequential mechanisms have become a pervasive method of exchange in online and offline markets. In
such mechanisms, either the seller or a buyer offers the fixed price and an auction serves as outside
option in case the price is rejected. For example, eBay.com offers a format where the seller states a
price at which he is willing to sell the product before the auction. Other internet trading platforms (e.g.,
Hood.de) offer both types of mechanisms.1 At many real estate markets, buyers can offer a price before
the auction. Trade volumes of sequential mechanisms total billions of dollars per year. For instance, sales
based on fixed prices in such combined mechanisms became the primary contributor to all fixed price
sales on eBay.com, accounting for 28% of the gross merchandize volume in 2003 growing to 66% in 2012
(eBay, 2003, 2012). Hood.de ascribes 86% of the transaction volume to sales from combined mechanisms
(Czyron, 2014 ). In the Melbourne housing market, 12% of properties listed to be auctioned off were
sold in privately negotiated sales before the auction day (Quan (1994)). In Germany, 40% of scheduled
foreclosure sale real estate auctions do not take place partly because interested buyers make price offers
resulting in sales before the auction (Hammer, 2004).
Theoretically, who makes the price offer has different strategic implications. While the seller needs to
take care of the adverse selection effect of his price offer, the format where buyers make the price offer
constitutes a signaling game. However, maybe surprisingly, who has the bargaining power has no effect
on how revenues are shared. Predicted final outcomes in both formats are the same: the price offer is
always rejected and sales take place in the auction when agents are risk neutral (see Ivanova-Stenzel and
Kro¨ger (2008) –IK, hereafter–, Shunda, 2009, and Grebe (2008) –G, hereafter). The empirical evidence
above shows, however, that a substantial part of the fixed sales ends before the auction. The question
arises whether who has the power prior to the auction has an effect on the number of fixed sales, prices,
profits and efficiency. The answer to this question is of practical interest for auctioneers (i.e., the market
platform) as well as for sellers and buyers in case they can choose between formats.
2 Experimental design and risk neutral benchmark
In this article, we compare experimentally two formats that consist of a fixed price offer followed by a
second-price sealed-bid auction, similar to those used in reality. The price offer is either made by the
seller, the “Buy-It-Now” auction (BIN treatment hereafter), or by a buyer, the “Sell-It-Now” auction
(SIN treatment hereafter). The item for sale is indivisible and offered in the bargaining phase to one of
the two buyers (henceforth first buyer). If the price offer is rejected, the price is determined by a second–
price sealed–bid auction without a reservation price with the first buyer and one additional buyer.2 Both
buyers place their bids simultaneously. Buyers’ valuations for the good are private and iid vi ∼ U [0, 1]
with i = 1, 2.3 The seller values the object at 0. The seller’s valuation and the distribution of buyer
valuation were common knowledge.
The experiment was computerized and conducted with zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). Trading groups
1eBay and Hood.de name the format where the seller makes the price offer “Buy It Now” auction. Hood.de offers the
format where the buyer makes the offer under the name “Preis vorschlagen” (“Make an offer”).
2The additional buyer is not informed about the price offered at the bargaining stage.
3In the experiment, values were integers drawn from [0, 100]. For the ease of comparison to the theoretical predictions,
all results are reported for normalized valuation in the [0, 1] range.
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were randomly rematched in every period. The roles of buyers and sellers were determined randomly and
kept throughout the experiment. Each buyer was in the position of the first buyer in 16 out of 32 periods.
We adopted a between subjects design with 10 sessions per treatment and a total of 210 participants
(BIN : 90, SIN : 120).4
The risk neutral benchmark predicts for both formats no transactions to take place prior to the
auction regardless of who has the bargaining power. For both formats one can derive a threshold price
p˜(v1) = (1− (1− v1)2)/2 for the first buyer with valuation v1 above which he does not accept any price
in the BIN format and above which he will not make a price offer in the SIN format. Sellers need to
condition on this threshold. For the BIN format, sellers need to take the adverse selection effect of their
offer into account – low offers not only generate low profits in the bargaining stage but also in the auction
stage as buyers who reject low offers are those who have low values.5 It can be shown that offers of
pBIN ≥ 0.5, that are high enough to avoid the selection effect, maximize expected profit. Given that the
threshold is monotone in the first buyer ’s valuation and that the maximum threshold is p˜(1) = 0.5 for
the highest possible valuation (v1 = 1), price offers are always too high to be accepted pBIN ≥ p˜(v1) ∀v1,
and all trades end in the auction. For the SIN format, it can be shown that the expected revenue of the
seller equals the first buyer ’s threshold, p˜(v1).6 Thus, sellers would accept price offers of pSIN > p˜(v1).
However, prices above the threshold will never be offered and in consequence the seller should always
reject and all trades end in the auction.7
In summary, the risk neutral benchmark predicts BIN prices above 0.5 and SIN prices below p˜(v1).
Price offers are never accepted and all sales take place in the auction. Thus, bargaining power has no
effect. Outcomes in both mechanisms are the same as in a second-price sealed-bid auction: seller revenues
of 0.33, buyer profits of 0.16 and 100% efficiency (where efficient outcome is defined as one where the
buyer with the highest valuation gets the object).
3 Results
In the experiment, we observe a total of 2 240 trades, (BIN : 30 sellers x 32 periods= 960; SIN : 40 sellers
x 32 periods = 1 280). Columns (1)–(3) of Table 1 present descriptive statistics and test results for the
key variables of interest for both formats. We find seller revenues and buyer profits close to the theoretical
risk neutral benchmark prediction without significant differences between treatments. Efficiency rates do
not differ across treatments and are with 85% (BIN ) and 83% (SIN ) comparable to results from other
second-price sealed-bid auction experiments (e.g., Kagel and Levin (1993): 79%, Gu¨th, Ivanova-Stenzel,
and Wolfstetter (2005): 88%). Contrary to the risk neutral benchmark, we observe a substantial amount
of agreements reached in the bargaining phase. The share of transactions at the fixed price comprises
around one third in both treatments.
Altogether, we do not observe significant differences between the two treatments, suggesting that the
bargaining power in the BIN and SIN format does not affect aggregate outcomes. These findings suggest
4Complete sets of the original (German) or translated instructions are available upon request to the authors.
5Seller’s maximization problem in BIN : maxp (Pr{p ≤ p˜(v1)}p + (1− Pr{p ≤ p˜(v1)})E[RA|p˜(v1) < p]) , with RA expected
revenue from the auction.
6Seller’s expected auction revenue in SIN : E[RA|v1] = (1− v1)v1 +
∫ v1
0 (x)dx = (1− (1− v1)2)/2 = p˜(v1).
7For details of the theoretical results, for n > 2 buyers and for asymmetric buyers, see IK and G.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Sellers BIN sellers with :
pBIN < 0.5 pBIN ≥ 0.5
Format BIN SIN p-value BIN SIN p-value BIN SIN p-value
Seller revenue 0.33 0.32 0.33
MWU,
n = 20 0.31 0.34 0.01
SR,
n = 18 0.36 0.34 0.04
SR,
n = 12
Bidder profit 0.15 0.15 1.00
MWU,
n = 20
Efficiency 85% 83% 0.65
MWU,
n = 20
Acceptance rate 0.33 0.37 0.12
MWU,
n = 20 0.39 0.25 0.24 0.08
Nobs BIN 960 576 384
Nobs SIN 1 280 737 280 491 520
Nobs sessions 10 10 10
Nobs sellers 30 40 18 12
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for both treatments for all transactions, and separately for BIN sellers.
P-values from two sided non-parametric tests of no difference (Mann-Whitney-U and Sign Rank) in
columns (3), (6) and (9).
for market platforms, that usually earn a share of the sales price, there is no difference in their expected
revenues between both formats.
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of accepted (solid circles) and rejected (empty circles) price offers, and threshold
(p˜(v1)) in relation to the first buyer ’s valuation for BIN (left panel) and SIN (right panel) treatment.
Benchmark prediction for BIN at p = 0.5.
An analysis of behavior at the individual level for both treatments is presented in Figure 1. There, all
individual price offers for both treatments (BIN – left panel and SIN – right panel) are shown relative
to the valuation and price threshold (p˜(v1)) of the first buyer. Most accepted BIN prices and offered
SIN prices are below the threshold (SIN : 70% and BIN : 57%). Those deviations from the risk neutral
benchmark can be easily reconciled with risk aversion (G, IK, and Reynolds and Wooders (2009)). Also
seller behavior seems similar between treatments. 52% of the BIN offers (left panel) and 67% of the
accepted SIN prices (solid circles in right panel) are below 0.5. The debate is ongoing to what extent
risk preferences or bounded rationality cause making and accepting such low price offers (Mathews and
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Katzman (2006), G, and IK). If those deviations are not random, the question arises whether our result
of no differences in aggregate profits for sellers and buyers also apply at the individual level.
We do not find differences in individual buyer behavior. Among sellers, however, we observe hetero-
geneity in behavior, that we summarize in the left panel of Figure 2 as BIN price offer quartiles. Of
all BIN sellers, 27% behave according to the theoretical prediction (75% or more of their price offers
pBIN ≥ 0.5), whereas 33% deviate substantially, i.e., hardly ever offer above 0.5 (75% or more of their
price offers pBIN < 0.5). A similar analysis in the SIN treatment reveals that only 8% of all SIN sellers
never accept offers below 0.5.
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Figure 2: Scatter plots for each individual seller in the BIN treatment. Reference lines at 0.5.
Left panel: BIN prices (median, 25th percentile (min) and 75th percentile (max)).
Right panel: Average realized BIN profits and hypothetical SIN revenues.
To answer the question whether different seller types gain from one or the other format, we construct
for BIN sellers a counterfactual SIN treatment by interpreting their BIN price as the minimal price they
would have accepted in the SIN format. Then, we confront each observed SIN price offer with the BIN
price and presume that a seller would accept the SIN price if it lays at or above his BIN price. Otherwise,
an auction is held presuming both buyers bid their true values. The right panel of figure 2 presents for
each seller the average (actual) revenue from the BIN treatment and the average (hypothetical) revenue in
the counterfactual SIN treatment. Columns (4)–(9) of Table 1 report the corresponding average numbers
for all sellers and results of testing for revenue equality. The results suggest that sellers can benefit from
a particular format. Sellers who offer average BIN prices below the theoretical benchmark prediction,
pBIN < 0.5, would make a higher profit in the SIN format. This is due to the fact that first buyers
with higher valuation offer prices in the SIN format that lay above the prices those sellers ask for in the
BIN format. We also find that sellers offering prices in line with the theoretical benchmark prediction,
pBIN ≥ 0.5, benefit from their bargaining power as they make higher profits in the BIN format compared
to their profits in the counterfactual SIN format.
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4 Conclusions
We study two sequential trading mechanisms with an auction as outside option when a negotiation fails
to produce a sale. The mechanisms differ in who has the bargaining power - the seller (BIN auction) or
a buyer (SIN auction). We do not find differences between the two formats in aggregate outcomes, i.e.,
seller revenue, buyer profit, acceptance rates, and efficiency. Hence, market makers whose profits usually
comprise a share of seller revenues can freely choose between both formats.
An examination on the individual level reveals no advantages for buyers being in one or the other
format. A counterfactual analysis suggests, however, that some sellers might benefit from either having or
giving up their bargaining power. Sellers who make too low price offers in the BIN format would benefit
and earn higher profits when they give up their bargaining power and let the buyer offer the price in the
SIN format. Sellers who demand high BIN prices, in line with the risk neutral benchmark prediction,
make larger profits in the BIN compared to the SIN format.
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